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THE RULE OF LAW SOLD SHORT
A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND
BALANCING. By Francisco J. Urbina.1 New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xii + 267. $110.00
(cloth).
Richard Stacey2
INTRODUCTION
In his latest contribution to the theoretical literature on rights
adjudication and the rule of law, Professor Francisco Urbina adds
to the chorus of criticism levelled against the principle of
proportionality and methods of judicial decision-making that rely
on the balancing of constitutional rights and competing interests.
To those unfamiliar with the background of this long-running
jurisprudential debate, the principle of proportionality offers a
heuristic for judges and lawmakers to determine whether the
statutory limitation of a constitutionally protected right is justified
by the benefits the rights-limiting measure produces. A court
should uphold rights-limiting legislation if the extent to which the
measure limits the affected right is proportionate to the good it
produces, or, in other words, if the good achieved by limiting the
right outweighs the harm it causes.
In A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing, Urbina
argues that the principle of proportionality is fatally susceptible to
a conspectus of objections, and that public law should accordingly
abandon proportionality analysis altogether. Instead, we should
conceive of constitutional rights as narrowly specified and
absolute legal categories that a government is never justified in
limiting. For Urbina, upholding rights and the interests they
protect is a categorical imperative. In this respect he departs from
the constitutional orthodoxy represented by the limitations
clauses of post-war constitutional documents in Canada,
1.
2.
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Germany, Israel, South Africa and in the European Convention
on Human Rights, for example, and prefers a model of rights
adjudication more in line with the position in the United States.
Urbina devotes the majority of the book, Parts I and II, to
surfacing proportionality’s purportedly fatal flaw: either
proportionality analysis is blind to the moral imperatives of
human rights, or it can accommodate these important moral
considerations only by compromising the rule-of-law values of
predictability and certainty (p. 2). The principle of proportionality
is thus caught on the horns of an irresoluble dilemma. Although
Urbina leaves enough space in the final chapter of the book only
to sketch the outlines of his alternative approach, it is a novel
solution to the proportionality debate that moves it beyond
arguments about which version of the proportionality test would
be best to adopt, all things considered, and towards a more direct
consideration of how a political community might best protect the
rights to which it is constitutionally committed. The book is a
valuable and thought-provoking contribution to the literature for
this reason.
I have two concerns about Urbina’s argument, however.
First, his critique of proportionality analysis relies on a conception
of the rule of law that ignores its connections to the deep
normative principles of a legal system, selling the rule of law short
by focusing only on the value of holding officials to the provisions
of formal legal rules.3 Second, the alternative model of absolute
rights that Urbina proposes seems to rely as much on
proportionality and balancing as the limitations models he
criticises. I present these concerns more fully below, following a
careful summary of the core of Urbina’s argument.
THE ASSAULT ON PROPORTIONALITY
In the opening pages of the book, Urbina sets out the
standard analytical model through which courts and lawmakers
assess the proportionality of rights-limiting statutory measures
(pp. 4-9). This four-stage inquiry asks, first, whether the purposes
for which a statutory measure limits a right is a legitimate or
3. I make the argument about the connections between proportionality analysis and
a rich, normative conception of the rule of law more fully in Richard Stacey, The
Magnetism of Moral Reasoning and the Principle of Proportionality in Comparative
Constitutional Adjudication, __ AM. J. COMP. L. ___ (forthcoming 2018).
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valuable one for a government to pursue; second, whether the
measure is rationally connected to, or likely to achieve that
objective; third, whether the means adopted to achieve the
objective impair the affected rights as little as possible (the least
restrictive means or minimal impairment test); and fourth,
whether the balance between the good achieved by limiting a right
and the harm caused by doing so is proportional “in the strict
sense.”
A major element of the book’s architecture is the distinction
Urbina draws between two conceptions of the principle of
proportionality, and the alternate versions of the proportionality
test that follow. One group of approaches adopts what he calls the
“maximisation account of proportionality,” in terms of which a
judge or lawmaker faced with a choice between upholding a right
against limitation or allowing its limitation in pursuit of some
competing interest is mandated to prefer the option that produces
the most good. Any losses occasioned by either striking down or
allowing a rights limitation must be compensated by the gains
achieved by doing so. Maximization in this sense involves a
quantitative comparison of the good each option would produce
in order to come to a conclusion about where the greater good lies
(pp. 18-21). Urbina offers the work of Robert Alexy, David
Beatty and Aharon Barak as examples of the maximisation
account of proportionality (chapter 2).4
The second conception of proportionality, which Urbina calls
“unconstrained moral reasoning,” does not demand the
application of one specific decision-making mechanism for
determining the proportionality of a rights limitation. Rather,
judges will engage directly with the reasons given by the parties
and assess them through “practical reasoning unconstrained by a
particular legal method or other legal categories. The idea of
justification,” Urbina goes on, “is at the centre of the main
theories of proportionality as unconstrained moral reasoning” (p.
126). While maximization accounts of proportionality rely on
utilitarian calculations of public good to generate a preference for
the limitation of a right or the striking down of rights-limiting
legislation, this alternative group of approaches requires
government to balance all the relevant moral considerations and
4. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS (2012); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002);
DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004).
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demonstrate that there are sufficiently strong reasons that justify
the restriction of constitutional rights or the striking down of
legislation passed by a democratically elected legislature. At the
base of this requirement is a commitment to moral autonomy,
both in the sense that any interference with the autonomy
inherent in constitutional rights must be justified and in the sense
that making moral arguments in support of one or other outcome
recognises and responds to the human capacity for rationality and
reason (pp. 126-31). Theorists in this camp, whose work espouses
this “culture of justification,” include Mattias Kumm, Kai Möller,
and Etienne Mureinik.5
As a small matter of jurisprudential taxonomy, I am not sure
I agree with Urbina that the version of proportionality analysis
described by Aharon Barak should be seen as a “maximisation
account” rather than an account centred on moral reasoning.
Barak’s view is that the outcome of the proportionality test should
depend on whether upholding a right on one hand or allowing its
limitation on the other is more “socially important” to the
political community affected.6 It is, of course, true that preferring
the option that is more socially important involves the
maximization of social importance, but the morally rich question
of how much socially important stuff each option delivers has to
be answered before any morally neutral maximization can take
place. Robert Alexy’s proposal for a “triadic” scale on which the
benefits and disadvantages of a rights limitation may be compared
also relies on an exercise in moral reasoning to work out whether
the extent of the infringement is serious, moderate, or minor, and
whether the importance of the public good sought to be achieved
by the limitation is high, moderate, or low.7

5. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification:
The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141 (2010);
KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2012); Etienne
Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 31 (1994). Urbina relies heavily on the work of Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat
in this section of the book to describe the conception of proportionality as unconstrained
moral reasoning: see MOSHE COHEN ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2013). However, in other work Cohen-Eliya and Porat are
critical of these approaches to proportionality analysis and prefer an approach that
depends on the more constrained and quantifiable legs of the proportionality test. See infra
note 9.
6. BARAK, supra note 4, at 349, 361. See also the judgment of the Israeli Supreme
Court in HCJ 14/86 Labor v. Israel Film & Theatre Council [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421, 343.
7. ALEXY, supra note 4, at 402–11.
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Disagreements in sorting proportionality theorists into one
or other of the camps Urbina describes may flow from the fact
that the standard model of proportionality analysis is capacious
and flexible enough to accommodate both conceptions of
proportionality (p. 7). There is no bright line between the two
approaches, and indeed it remains a matter of some debate
whether Canadian jurisprudence relies more on maximization or
moral reasoning to settle rights disputes.8
Maximization accounts lend themselves to more quantifiable
or mechanical application, and thus tend to avoid the flexible and
wide-ranging final stage of the inquiry in favour of a focus on the
first three legs of the inquiry. David Beatty prefers a version of
the proportionality test that never reaches the inquiry into
proportionality in the strict sense, and rests the outcome of the
analysis on whether the government has adopted the mechanism
of achieving legitimate objectives that limits rights as little as
possible.9 A balance must be struck, on this view, between the
means adopted to pursue an objective and the extent of the
infringement of rights: judges and lawmakers need never consider
the tricky and contentious question of whether a right is more
valuable than the objectives the limitation purports to achieve.
Approaches to proportionality analysis that rely on moral
reasoning, by contrast, focus attention on the fourth-stage inquiry
into proportionality in the strict sense. Inquiries that are restricted
to considering the relationship between the means adopted to
pursue some valuable objective and its effect on rights do not
capture all the moral implications of the policy alternatives. As
Aharon Barak argues, it may well be that shooting an apple thief
is the only and therefore least restrictive means of stopping the
thief and pursuing the objective of a theft-free society (or at least
a society in which thieves are brought to justice), but leaves open
the question of whether shooting an apple thief is a morally
acceptable response to the scourge of apple theft.10 It requires an
exercise in moral reasoning to work out which of the competing
8. See, for example, Denise Reaume, Limitations on Constitutional Rights: The
Logic of Proportionality, U. Oxford Legal Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 26/2009, August
2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463853.
9. BEATTY, supra note 4; see also Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and Substantive
Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence,
38 ISRAEL L. REV. 262, 263 (2005).
10. Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 373
(2007); BARAK supra note 4, at 342–43.
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interests a society should value more—a theft-free society and
justice for wrongdoers on one hand, or respect for bodily integrity
and due process on the other. Proportionality as moral reasoning
thus favours the inquiry into proportionality in the strict sense,
requiring a balance to be struck between the value of rights and
the value of competing interests.
But whichever approach to proportionality is followed, and
whatever considerations are thrown into the scales to be balanced,
Urbina argues there are reasons to avoid proportionality analysis
altogether. Maximization accounts of proportionality are
susceptible, he argues, to two well-known criticisms: the
incommensurability objection (chapter 3) and the problem of
moral blindness (chapters 4 and 5). The incommensurability
objection holds that there is neither a common metric nor a single
unifying property against which the value of rights and competing
social interests can be measured, compared, or balanced in a
meaningful or comprehensible way.11 It may well be that the
objectives achieved by a measure that limits a constitutional right
realizes some property or value to a greater degree than
upholding the right would realize some completely separate
property, but the comparison of these two properties is as
meaningless as asking whether a lot of happiness is better than a
moderate amount of blue paint (p. 47).12 The value that protecting
rights achieves is not commensurable with the value that fulfilling
a competing interest produces. Any attempt to resolve rights
disputes by attempting to maximize good (or utility or value) is
undermined by the incommensurability of the goods between
which lawmakers and judges have to choose.

11. The incommensurability objection is made in existing work, including some by
Urbina. See, e.g., Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7
INT’L J. CON. L. 468 (2009); Grégoire N Webber, Proportionality, Balancing and the Cult
of Constitutional Rights Scholarship, 23 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 179 (2010); and Francisco J
Urbina, Is it Really that Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and “Balancing and
Reasoning,” 27 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 167 (2014).
12. The metaphor that is often used to capture the problem of incommensurability is
that it is impossible to compare the length of a piece of string to the weight of a stone. See
Niels Petersen, How to Compare the Length of Lines to the Weight of Stones: Balancing
and the Resolution of Value Conflicts in Constitutional Law, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1387 (2013).
See also John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P George ed., 1992); James Griffin,
Incommensurability, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL
REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Stuart Woolman, LIMITATION, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop eds., 2nd ed., 2005).
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The second objection, the problem of moral blindness, goes
to the mechanical and formalistic nature of quantifying and
comparing the value of rights and builds on the idea that we
protect rights precisely because they have immeasurable value.
Proportionality understood as maximization undervalues the
intuition that there is some special normative force to the interests
that rights protect, and which justifies according rights a special
claim to pre-eminence in the legal system. Maximisation allows a
legislature to ignore the special normative force of rights if there
is a compelling reason to do so, and in turn undermines any
commitment to rights as trumps,13 side constraints14 or spheres of
individual inviolability15 (pp. 100-05).
Urbina accepts, however, that conceiving of proportionality
as unconstrained moral reasoning can meet both of these
objections (pp. 136-37). A decisionmaker need rely on a common
scale or metric for comparing rights and competing interests only
if her objective is to produce a quantified, cardinal ranking of
rights and competing interests—what other scholars have called
“interest balancing.”16 In this case, incommensurability between
the value of rights and competing interests presents a serious
obstacle. But cardinal rankings are not the only way to compare—
or balance—rights and competing interests. It is possible to bring
them into an ordinal relationship according to the extent to which
each option fulfils a political community’s deeply held moral
convictions. What others have called “balancing as reasoning”17
or Socratic “public reason oriented justification”18 requires
decisionmakers to justify the choice between upholding a right or
allowing its limitation on the basis that one or other option better
fulfils these moral convictions. These justifications rely on “openended moral reasoning” rather than numeric quantification. For
this reason, they need no quantitative metrics and sidestep the
incommensurability objection. At the same time, open-ended
moral reasoning is explicitly sensitive to the moral foundations of
rights, and is not susceptible to the problem of moral blindness
either.
13.
14.
15.
16.
(2012).
17.
18.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1978).
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24–25 (rev. ed., 1999).
Kai Möller, Proportionality: Challenging the Critics, 10 INT’L J. CON. L. 709, 715
Id.
Kumm, supra note 5, at 143.
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Open-ended moral reasoning is, however, susceptible to the
third of the complaints that Urbina raises against proportionality
analysis. The open-endedness of balancing as reasoning or public
reason oriented justification makes it reliant, not on numeric or
mechanical calculations, but on decisionmakers’ unpredictable,
freewheeling, unprincipled, ad hoc, impressionistic and subjective
moral intuitions. The unpredictability of open-ended moral
reasoning renders it inconsistent with the rule-of-law demand that
the law deliver certainty and predictability to human relations.19
Urbina complains that meeting the incommensurability objection
and engaging frontally with rights’ moral imperatives leaves
proportionality analysis without any legal guidance and open to a
panoply of negative effects that flow from legally unconstrained
adjudication (chapters 7 and 8). The dilemma that traps
proportionality, Urbina argues, lies in the tension between
guidance and moral reasoning:
Because constraint is the necessary consequence of guidance
(if the law guides the judge towards a particular solution to the
case, then other alternative solutions are excluded), the more
specific the guidance provided by proportionality, the more it
will constrain the reasoning of the judge, and thus the less it
will allow for open-ended moral reasoning oriented towards
justification (p. 139).

For Urbina, either proportionality analysis involves a
predictable and systematic quantitative assessment of competing
policy alternatives that is at best morally insensitive and at worst
incomprehensible in the face of incommensurability, or it depends
on unpredictable and unconstrained moral reasoning that
undermines the rule of law.
With proportionality caught in this bind, Urbina proposes a
formalistic and categorical approach to human rights adjudication
that leaves no room for rights limitation at all (chapter 9). Rights
should instead be specified narrowly, categorically protecting core
interests from any interference no matter how compelling the
reasons for interference might be. Urbina’s proposal, “in short, is
to specify human rights into a body of legal categories capable of
providing legal guidance, and to apply such body of legal
categories to the solution of human rights cases” (p. 216). He
argues that this is nothing new to the law as a whole, since there
19.

Beatty, supra note 4, at 171; Tsakyrakis, supra note 11, at 482.
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are numerous legal categories through which judges resolve
disputes (pp. 218-23). And in some ways, this is nothing new to
rights jurisprudence either, since rights adjudication in the United
States is concerned more with clearly specifying the boundaries of
constitutional rights and considering whether they have been
breached than with questions of whether the breach of a widely
and capaciously conceived right is justifiable (pp. 247-51).
URBINA’S IMPOVERISHED CONCEPTION
OF THE RULE OF LAW
Urbina’s rationale for abandoning the principle of
proportionality in rights analysis is that, however it is conceived,
it cannot escape at least one of three serious objections. On the
logic of Urbina’s argument, though, if proportionality analysis can
be shown to be consistent with the rule of law and to function just
as predictably as other forms of legal analysis, then the principle
of proportionality can be rescued from the dilemma in which
Urbina finds it.
This is the first of two concerns I have with the argument in
the book, and it flows from Urbina’s reliance on an impoverished
conception of the rule of law. While Urbina understands the rule
of law to require the legal system to operate with predictability
and certainty, predictability and certainty are better conceived of
as products of a legal system that complies with the rule of law.
The subjects of a legal system are ruled by law rather than the
whim of individual rulers as long as they know what the law allows
them to do, and as long as officials are constrained in what they
are empowered to do by previously declared rules. Lon Fuller’s
eight principles of legality explain the qualities that a legal system
must have if it is to ensure the rule of law and not the rule of
officials. The first seven of these principles require the rules that
govern peoples’ interactions with one another to be clear, nonretroactive, stable over time and mutually consistent, to demand
from people only what is not impossible, to apply generally to
everyone and to be made known to the public.20 Compliance with
these principles, Fuller explains, allows a legal system to create
order in society. The principle of congruence, the eighth of
Fuller’s principles, demands that official conduct is congruent
with rules of law and that the exercise of public power remains
20.

LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed., 1969).
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within the limits set by the laws already made known to the
public.21 People can take for granted the stable operation of the
legal system and make life plans accordingly, precisely because
official conduct is predictable as long as it remains bound by
previously declared rules.
Moreover, the rule of law requires congruence not only
between official conduct and formal rules, but also between
official conduct and the normative principles on which the legal
system is founded. This is especially so in the context of
constitutional rights, precisely because constitutional rights are
worded in general and abstract language.22 It is difficult to work
out whether official conduct—the passage of legislation, for
example—is congruent with constitutional rights without a
process of interpretation that depends on something more than
just the plain text of the constitutional provision concerned.
Determining whether official conduct is congruent with
constitutional rights must turn to an excavation of the deep
normative principles on which rights are based.23
Urbina’s conception of the rule of law is much narrower. He
not only understands the principle of congruence to require
official conduct to adhere to only clear and unambiguous rules of
positive law, but suggests further that any consideration of
normativity is inconsistent with the rule of law. The “values
21. In the revised edition of The Morality of Law, Fuller calls the principle of
congruence the “very essence of the Rule of Law,” id. at 209–10. Further, holding officials
to previously declared rules affirms the view of human beings as morally autonomous by
ensuring that the plans they make, on the basis of their understanding of what the law
allows them to do, will not be upset by official conduct that is incongruent with, and
unpredictable in light of, previously declared rules, id. at 162–63. Note that predictability
and certainty are not among Fuller’s principles of legality, but are characteristics of a legal
system that adheres to these principles of legality. See also Richard Stacey, Popular
Sovereignty and Revolutionary Constitution-making, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 170–72 (David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn eds.,
2016).
22. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds.,
1994); see also Grégoire Webber, Rights and the Rule of Law in the Balance, 129 L.Q.R.
399, 410 (2013).
23. In this sense, rights adjudication looks like the hard cases Ronald Dworkin and
H. L. A. Hart argued about. While Hart submitted that in the penumbra of legal
uncertainty outside the law’s core of settled meaning, judges have an unfettered discretion
to make new law, H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–15 (1958), Dworkin argued that judge-made law in these hard
cases must remain congruent with the fundamental principles of justice that run
throughout the legal system. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 17.
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associated with [the rule of law]—such as certainty and
predictability in human relations,” Urbina asserts,
are severely harmed, if not sacrificed, when we make law
through legal categories that are so vague that they allow
judges to reason morally on what is the best solution to the
case, without any effective constraint imposed by the law. The
law then becomes uncertain and unpredictable, and there is no
guarantee that state power will be bound by clear and
previously established legal rules, known by its subjects, and
applied equally to those in the same situation (p. 148).

But rights cases often—perhaps usually—evoke deep
disagreements about what the position in the law actually is.24 The
law requires that rights be respected and protected nevertheless.
In these cases it is not possible to predict what the law allows or
requires members of society and officials to do without first
resolving disagreements about the content of rights. And because
the plain text of rights evokes these very disagreements, coming
to a conclusion about what the law requires and whether official
conduct is congruent with it has to rely on arguments that go to
the normative foundations of these rights. A consideration of the
moral foundations of the law in general and rights specifically is
thus not inevitably incompatible with a commitment to the rule of
law, as Urbina believes it is, but may in fact be required by it.25
Judges and lawmakers must pay attention to the moral
foundations of the legal system if they are to ensure that the laws
that constitute that system, which constrain the conduct of
officials and guide the choices of the members of society, are
congruent with the moral and normative foundations on which a
political community is built. Urbina’s rejection of moral reasoning
as inconsistent with the rule of law betrays a particularly
formalistic conception of the rule of law that is by no means the

24. Jeremy Waldron’s work on the rule of law and rights adjudication begins from
the premise that serious disagreements about the nature and content of rights are
inevitable and must be taken seriously by any theory of law. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 AM.
J. JURIS. 75 (1998).
25. Richard Stacey, Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation
Seriously in the Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL. (2017) (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2843765.
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only game in town,26 and in fact overlooks the connection between
normativity and the rule of law, and thus, moral reasoning and the
rule of law.
More than this, there is little reason to accept Urbina’s
contention that moral reasoning is any less predictable or certain
than any other form of legal reasoning. Consider how the
founding principles or values a political community sets out in its
constitution aim to capture that community’s moral and
normative commitments at the same time as they aim to guide
judicial decisionmaking and lawmaking. Public officials are bound
by these fundamental normative principles just as much as by the
formal rules of law set out in statutes. What is required by any
particular formal rule therefore presupposes that that formal rule
is congruent with underlying normative principles. This is, after
all, what a commitment to constitutional supremacy means. The
familiar process of legal interpretation that goes into working out
precisely what a formal rule requires will often refer to these
normative principles.27
Legal interpretation, even of formal rules, is thus infused
with the normative commitments at the foundation of the legal
system. The moral reasoning that judges and lawmakers engage
in when working out whether upholding a right or allowing its
limitation is more closely aligned with the normative
commitments set out as basic constitutional principles is therefore
just as predictable and certain as many other instances of legal
interpretation.
Another way of putting the concern with Urbina’s argument
is that he sees unconstrained moral reasoning as unpredictable,
and for this reason necessarily incompatible with the rule of law.
But surely moral reasoning directed towards upholding the
principles already set out in a constitution is constrained by the
interpretive limits of those principles? From a practical
26. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity? 13 L. &
PHIL. 259, 275–80 (1994); T. R. S. Allan, The Moral Unity of Public Law, 67 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1 (2017).
27. Consider the principle of statutory interpretation, set out for example by the
South African Constitutional Court, that when a provision of positive law admits of two
equally plausible interpretations officials must prefer the interpretation that is consistent
with constitutional principles: Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and
Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), paras 21–
23.
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perspective, the global jurisprudence of rights limitations provides
a number of examples of constitutional principles that constrain
and direct proportionality analysis: in South Africa, rights
limitations must be consistent with the commitment to “human
dignity, equality and freedom” in an “open and democratic
society”;28 in Canada, limitations must be justifiable in a “free and
democratic society”;29 and in Israel, limitations must befit “the
values of the State of Israel” as “a Jewish and democratic state”
and which in turn include “human dignity and liberty.”30 These
are capacious principles, to be sure, but they set limits to
constitutional jurisprudence and guide judges in these
jurisdictions all the same.
Urbina’s argument for abandoning proportionality depends
on the irresolubility of the dilemma proportionality analysis faces,
and on the conclusion that neither conception of proportionality
can overcome all three objections. But proportionality as
constitutionally constrained moral reasoning does meet all three
complaints. Urbina’s primary reason for proposing the
abandonment of the principle of proportionality in rights
adjudication thus loses much of its persuasive force.
BALANCING IN THE SPECIFICATION
OF LEGAL CATEGORIES
My second concern with Urbina’s argument goes to his
justification for an alternative, categorical approach to rights. In
Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin famously makes the
case for rights as trumps, setting out what looks to be something
like a categorical imperative for the protection of rights. He states
in various places, for example, that any infringement of rights in
pursuit of collective social objectives “threatens to destroy the
28. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 36.
29. Constitution Act of 1982, section 1 (Can.).
30. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), articles 1, 1A and 8. For
discussion of the values of the state of Israel and how the Supreme Court of Israel has
attempted to provide concrete guidance to how they operate in assessing the
constitutionality of laws, see Aeyal M Gross, Global Values and Local Realities: The Case
of Israeli Constitutional Law, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Denis Davis, Alan
Richter & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2015); AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., Princeton University Press, 2005); H.C.J. 6821/93 United
Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village IsrSC 49(4), 221 (1995); H.C.J. 212/03 at
354; H.C.J. 4112/99 Adalah – The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority v. TelAviv-Jaffa Municipality IsrSC 56(5) 393 (2002).
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concept of individual rights,”31 discards the position that rights are
trumps,32 and is ultimately morally wrong.33 But even Dworkin
accepts that rights are not absolute, and that it is sometimes
appropriate to resolve conflicts between two rights by balancing one
right against another.34 It is acceptable to limit a right, Dworkin says,
for a “compelling reason . . . that is consistent with the supposition
on which the original right must be based.”35
One way of seeing Dworkin’s comments here is as a form of
balancing as reasoning familiar to proportionality analysis. The
trumps here are not the rights themselves so much as the
principles and commitments that rights express. Whichever policy
option represents the best way to fulfill these commitments is
what we should accord the pre-eminence of trumps.36 Another
way of understanding Dworkin’s view is that we should continue
to see rights as trumps, but only to the extent that they do protect
or advance these fundamental normative commitments. And to
the extent that they do this, they are absolute and categorically
inviolable. This is the approach to which I suspect Urbina would
be more sympathetic, since it preserves an illimitable core of
rights that will never be balanced against competing interests.
But notice how the process of filling in the absolutely
protected core of rights depends on coming to the conclusion that
protecting certain interests and not others is the best way to
achieve the normative commitments on which the pre-eminence
of rights depends. This necessarily involves some degree of
balancing among the competing alternatives, weighing up
whether protecting something absolutely as a right or excluding it
from the sphere of things a right protects and allowing the pursuit
of some other interest better realises our normative
commitments. The only way we can come to a view about what it
is that rights protect absolutely involves some degree of
proportionality analysis.
Somewhat surprisingly, Urbina seems to endorse this
conclusion. Specifying the content of absolute rights, he says in
31.
32.

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 197–99.
RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE (2006), 48–49.
33. Id. at 31.
34. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 191, 199; DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 49-51.
35. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 200.
36. See Jacob Weinrib, When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of
Proportionality (Aug. 30, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2832405.
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the closing pages of the book, “requires some open-ended moral
and political reasoning on behalf of judges, since they need to
come up with their own understanding of the specification of the
relevant human rights” (p. 250). It is unclear how Urbina can be
committed to a view of rights analysis that rejects open-ended
moral reasoning in the balancing of rights and competing interests
in particular cases of conflict, yet rely on open-ended moral
reasoning in specifying the content of each right to be protected
absolutely. The reasons for which he criticises proportionality as
unconstrained moral reasoning would seem to apply as strongly
to his alternative position. Urbina attempts to meets this concern
by intimating that his alternative proposal for rights adjudication
sidesteps rule-of-law complaints about predictability and
certainty because judges “are guided by the legal categories in
place” (p. 250). But surely, then, he must also be bound to admit
that any version of proportionality analysis that is similarly guided
by legal categories—such as the principles and values set out in a
constitutional document—is just as consistent with the rule of law
as his alternative.
Ultimately, Urbina is caught in an irresoluble dilemma all of
his own: either his alternative model of rights adjudication is as
reliant on unpredictable moral reasoning as the conceptions of
proportionality analysis he criticises, or both proportionality
analysis and his alternative model are equally consistent with the
rule of law and there is accordingly no compelling reason to
abandon morally rich, public reason oriented conceptions of
proportionality analysis in the first place.

